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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Assuming the filing of a timely notice of appeal, this
court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §§ 78-2-3(3) (j) and 78-2(a)-3(2) (k) (1992).

However, as set

forth below, the notice of appeal in this unlawful detainer
action was not filed within ten days of the lower court's summary
judgment order.

Accordingly, this court is without jurisdiction.

See Utah R. App. P. 4(a).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The threshold issue is whether this court has
jurisdiction.

Assuming that the court reaches the merits of the

appeal, the issue is: Did the district court err in ruling that
the Ground Lease was duly terminated prior to any alleged offset
or waiver?

Standard of Review:

Because this issue was decided

on a motion for summary, the appellate court reviews the facts in
the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment
and affirms a grant of summary judgment only if the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

First American

Commerce Co. v. Washington Mut. Sav. Bank. 743 P.2d 1193, 1194
(Utah 1987).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The determinative provision in this appeal is Utah Rule
of Appellate Procedure 4(a).

That rule provides in pertinent

part:
[W]hen a judgment or order is entered in a
statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer
action, the notice of appeal required by rule

3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial
court within 10 days after the date of entry
of the judgment or order appealed from.
Assuming that this court reaches the merits of the
appeal, the determinative statute is the Utah Forcible Entry and
Detainer Statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-36-1, et seq. (1992).

A

copy of the statute is attached as Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal is from the judgment of the Fifth Judicial

District Court of Iron County, Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite.
Pursuant to its amended complaint, the plaintiff, Brian Head Ski,
Ltd. (the "Plaintiff") sought an order confirming and declaring
that the Ground Lease had been terminated and that neither the
defendant Brian Head Leasing, Ltd. (the "Defendant") nor any
other parties claiming an interest under the Defendant had any
interest in the property or the right to any ingress or egress to
the property.1

On April 26, 1993, the Plaintiff filed a motion

for summary judgment.
Defendant.2

The motion was opposed only by the

The motion was granted by the district court on

September 10, 1993. The order was filed on September 13, 1993.
A copy of the Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
because the names of the parties are so similar (Brian Head
Ski and Brian Head Leasing), this brief will use the terms
"Plaintiff" and "Defendant" to avoid confusion.
2

The other defendants in the matter did not oppose the
motion and did not join in the Defendant's appeal.
2

Judgment is attached as Addendum B.

On October 7, 1993, the

Defendant filed its untimely notice of appeal from the district
court's order granting summary judgment.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In its memorandum in support of summary judgment, the

Plaintiff listed the following undisputed material facts. The
Defendant did not specifically controvert any of these facts, as
required by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e).

A copy of the

Memorandum of Brian Head Ski, Ltd. in Support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment is attached as Addendum C.
1.

On or about September 4, 1978, Brian Head

Enterprises, Inc. ("BH Enterprises")3, entered into a Ground
Lease Agreement (the "Ground Lease") with the Defendant.
Addendum C at 1 1.
2.

The Ground Lease related to certain real property

upon which is constructed a seasonal snack bar and fast food
restaurant for the Brian Head Ski Resort (the "Property").

Id.

at 1 2.
3.

The Ground Lease provided, among other

obligations, that the Defendant pay annual rent in the amount of
One Hundred Dollars.

Id. at 1 2.

3

BH Enterprises is the predecessor-in-interest of the
Plaintiff.
3

4.

The Defendant failed to pay the annual rent as

required by the Ground Lease for twelve consecutive years.

Id.

at 1 4.
5.

On or about July 26, 1991, notice was given by

certified mail (return receipt requested) to the Defendant
(through its general partner Harold Jensen, Jr.), that the
Defendant was in default of its obligations under the Ground
Lease, and that the Defendant's rights under the Ground Lease
would be terminated without further notice unless the default was
cured and payment made within three days after service of said
notice upon the Defendant.
6.

Id. at 1 8.

Jensen acknowledged receipt of the certified

mailing of the notice on July 30, 1991.
7.

Id. at 1 9.

The said notice was also posted upon the Property.

Id. at 1 7.
8.

The Defendant made no attempt to cure the default

within the time period specified in the notice and Jensen had no
"answer" or explanation as to why it did not.
9.

Id. at 1 11.

When the Defendant failed to cure the default

within the time period specified in the notice, an action was
filed on August 9, 1991, to confirm that the Defendant's rights
under the Ground Lease were terminated, and that the Defendant
and any subtenants of the Defendant were in unlawful detainer of
the Property.

Id. at 1 12.

4

10.

On May 21, 1992, the Plaintiff as assignee of

Brian Head North Condominium Development Corporation, acquired
all of the assets (but not the liabilities) of the Brian Head Ski
Resort.

Included in those assets was the fee title to the

Property and BH Enterprise's interest in the previously
terminated Ground Lease.
11.

Id. at 1 25.

At the time the Defendant purported to pay taxes

on the Property, the Ground Lease had already been terminated and
funds were in escrow from the Plaintiff's purchase of the
Property to pay all real property taxes on the Property.

The

Plaintiff paid the 1992 real property taxes on the Property.

Id.

at 1 34.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The notice of appeal in this unlawful detainer case was
not filed within ten days as required by Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4(a).

Accordingly this court is without jurisdiction.

Assuming that the appellate court reaches the merits of
the appeal, the decision of the lower court should be affirmed.
The district court properly held that any alleged offset in this
case came after the Ground Lease had already been terminated.
Accordingly, the district court acted appropriately in granting
the motion for summary judgment.

Because the Ground Lease had

been terminated, the defendant's arguments regarding waiver and
equity (all of which involve actions taken after the lease was

5

already terminated) were also properly rejected by the district
court.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS NOT TIMELY FILED AND THEREFORE
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION.
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

provides that "when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory
forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal
required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial
court within ten days after the date of entry of the judgment or
order appealed from."

The timely filing of a notice of appeal is

a jurisdictional requirement.

If a timely notice of appeal is

not filed, this court must dismiss the appeal.

"Whether by [the

court's] own discovery or by a motion of a party, dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction will be considered at any stage of the
proceedings when it appears that jurisdiction, is in fact,
lacking."

Silva v. Dep't of Employment S e c . 786 P.2d 246, 247

(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
In this case, the district court signed the order
granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on September 10,
1993.

The order was filed on September 13, 1993.

Because this

case is an action for unlawful detainer, a notice of appeal had
to be filed no later than September 23, 1993. The notice of
appeal in this case was not filed until October 7, 1993.

Because

the notice of appeal was not filed within ten days as required by
6

Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), the notice of appeal is
defective and this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the
appeal.
II.

EVEN IF THE COURT CONSIDERS THE MERITS OF THE MATTERf THE
DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT MUST BE AFFIRMED.
Even if the court considers the merits of this appeal,

it must affirm the decision of the district court.

The

undisputed facts establish that the Ground Lease had been
terminated due to the Defendant's admitted failure to timely pay
ground rents due after receiving notice and opportunity to cure.
The district court specifically found:
The Ground Lease at issue was duly terminated
prior to any alleged offset by payment of
taxes or cure by defendant Brian Head
Leasing, Ltd., and defendant Brian Head
Leasing, Ltd., or any parties claiming
through it, have no interest in the Property
which was formerly subject to the Ground
Lease.
Addendum B at \ 2.
The Defendant alleged an offset or defense to
termination of the Ground Lease in that it asserts that it paid
property taxes that should have been paid by BH Enterprises.
This payment of property taxes was made by Jensen by personal
check on February 3, 1992, some seven months after the Ground
Lease had already been terminated in August of 1991.
Thus, as the district court properly hold, the alleged payment of
taxes by Jensen is legally insufficient to prevent summary
j udgment.
7

The Ground Lease had already been terminated in August
of 1991, and because of such termination, there was no existing
covenant on the part of the Plaintiff or its predecessor to pay
any taxes.

The Ground Lease no longer existed.

Termination of

the Ground Lease became effective after a notice of default was
sent on July 26, 1991, received by the Defendant on July 30,
1991, and no cure of the default was made during the time period
specified.
The lessee is entitled to the time specified in the
notice to which to cure the default, prior to taking effect of
the forfeiture, but the notice terminates the lease after
expiration of the specified period.

51 C.J.S., "Landlord &

Tenant" § 114(3).
Under common law, failure to cure a default notice
which also states that the lease will be terminated without
further notice is effective.

In Whitman v. Cearley, 251 S.W.2d

960 (Tex Ct. App. 1952), a landlord's letter advised the tenant
that unless the full amount of delinquent rent was paid within
two weeks, the lease would be canceled and appropriate legal
proceedings immediately instituted.

The court held that this

letter automatically effected cancellation of the lease at the
expiration of such time, when the rent due was not paid, and no
furtiier action by landlord to terminate the lease was "necessary
or appropriate."

Id. at 961. This is in accordance with the

8

terms of the Ground Lease in question which provides in Article
VI:
"The Lessee hereby covenants and agrees that
if a default shall be made in the payment of
rent....then said Lessee shall become a
tenant at sufferance, hereby waiving all
right of notice, and the Lessor shall be
entitled immediately to re-enter and retake
possession of the demised premises.11
The Defendant's general partner, Mr. Jensen, drafted the
foregoing provision.

(Jensen Dep. p. 16.)

It is clear that the

Defendant received far more notice and opportunity to cure than
was required under the Ground Lease.
Even if the Defendant were to argue that some
additional notice of termination is required, the unequivocal act
of filing this eviction suit would be effective as such
additional notice.

Enders v. Wesley W. Hubbard & Sons. Inc., 513

P.2d 992 (Idaho 1973).
Because the lease had already been terminated, the
district court properly held that, as a matter of law, the socalled offset by the Defendant was immaterial.

In addition, the

Defendant's arguments regarding waiver and equity are also
immaterial.

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff waived its

rights because it "filed the complaint for unlawful detainer in
August 1991, and thereafter allowed the lessee to stay in
possession of the premises."
curious argument.

Brief of Appellant at 8.

This is a

As a matter of law, once an unlawful detainer

lawsuit had been filed, there was nothing for the Plaintiff to do
9

short of taking the law into its own hands and forcibly evicting
the Defendant.

The district court properly held that, as a

matter of law, the actions taken by the plaintiff after the
unlawful detainer suit had been filed did not constitute waiver.
Finally, the Defendant argues that the district court
should have

!l

do[ne] equity by recognizing that it would be fair

and equitable to allow the payment of taxes as a setoff for the
rent."

Brief of Appellant at 9.

However, the court properly

held that the alleged payment of taxes came after the lease had
been already terminated and therefore, as a matter of law, could
not constitute a valid setoff.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Brian Head Ski Ltd.,
respectfully requests that this court dismiss the appeal for lack
of jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, affirm the decision of
the district court in this case.
DATED this

3*

day of March, 1994.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

J4me^ S. J^rdin
Larry G. Moore
Brent D. Wride
Attorneys for Brian Head Ski,
Ltd. Plaintiff/Appellee
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Tab A

78-36-9

JUDICIAL CODE

possession of the property to the plaintiff. If at the
hearing the court allows the defendant to remain in
possession and further issues remain to be adjudicated between the parties, the court shall require the
defendant to post a bond as required in Subsection
(2Kb). If at the hearing the court rules that all issues
between the parties can be adjudicated without further court proceedings, the court shall, upon adjudicating those issues, enter judgment on the merits.
1987

78-36-9. P r o o f r e q u i r e d by plaintiff — Defense.
On the trial of any proceeding for any forcible entry
or forcible detainer the plaintiff shall only be required to show, in addition to the forcible entry or
forcible detainer complained of, t h a t he was peaceably in the actual possession at the time of the forcible entry, or was entitled to the possession at the
time of the forcible detainer. The defendant may
show in his defense that he or his ancestors, or those
whose interest in such premises he claims, had been
in the quiet possession thereof for the space of one
whole year continuously next before the commencement of the proceedings, and that his interest therein
is not then ended or determined; and such showing is
a bar to the proceedings.
1953
78-36-10.

J u d g m e n t for r e s t i t u t i o n , d a m a g e s ,
and rent — Immediate enforcement —
Treble damages.
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or
upon default. A judgment entered in favor of the
plaintiff shall include an order for the restitution of
the premises. If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or agreement under
which the property is held, or after default in the
payment of rent, the judgment shall also declare the
forfeiture of the lease or agreement.
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried
without a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall
also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff
from any of the following:
(a) forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is alleged in the complaint and proved at trial;
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer is after default in the payment of
rent; and
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction
as provided in Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16.
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for three times the amount of the
damages assessed under Subsections (2)(a) through
(2)(c), and for reasonable attorney's fees, if they are
provided for in the lease or agreement.
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after
default in the payment of the rent, execution upon
the judgment shall be issued immediately after the
entry of the judgment. In all cases, the judgment may
be issued and enforced immediately.
1992
78-36-11. T i m e for a p p e a l .
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), either
party may, within ten days, appeal from the judgment rendered.
(2) In a nuisance action under Sections 78-38-9
through 78-38-16, any party may appeal from the
judgment rendered within three days.
1992

508

78-36-12.

Exclusion of t e n a n t w i t h o u t judicial
process prohibited —
Abandoned
premises excepted.
It is unlawful for an owner to willfully exclude a
tenant from the tenant's premises m any manner except by judicial process, provided, an owner or his
agent shall not be prevented from removing the contents of the leased premises under Subsection
78-36-12.6(2) and retaking the premises and attempting to rent them at a fair rental value when the tenant has abandoned the premises.
i»si
78-36-12.3. Definitions.
(1) "Willful exclusion" means preventing the tenant from entering into the premises with intent to
deprive the tenant of such entry.
(2) "Owner" means the actual owner of the premises and shall also have the same meaning as landlord under common law and the statutes of this state.
(3) "Abandonment" is presumed in either of the following situations:
(a) The tenant has not notified the owner that
he or she will be absent from the premises, and
the tenant fails to pay rent within 15 days after
the due date, and there is no reasonable evidence
other than the presence of the tenant's personal
property that the tenant is occupying the premises; or
(b) The tenant has not notified the owner that
he or she will be absent from the premises, and
the tenant fails to pay rent when due and the
tenant's personal property has been removed
from the dwelling unit and there is no reasonable
evidence that the tenant is occupying the premises.
1981
78-36-12.6. A b a n d o n e d p r e m i s e s — R e t a k i n g
a n d r e r e n t i n g by o w n e r — Liability of
t e n a n t — P e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y of t e n a n t
left on p r e m i s e s .
(1) In the event of abandonment the owner may
retake the premises and attempt to rent them at a
fair rental value and the tenant who abandoned the
premises shall be liable:
(a) for the entire rent due for the remainder of
the term; or
(b) for rent accrued during the period necessary to re-rent the premises at a fair rental
value, plus the difference between the fair rental
value and the rent agreed to in the prior rental
agreement, plu.s a reasonable commission for the
renting of the premises and the costs, if any, necessary to restore the rental unit to its condition
when rented by the tenant less normal wear and
tear. This subsection applies, if less than Subsection (a) notwithstanding that the owner did not
re-rent the premises
(2) If the tenant has abandoned the premises and
has left personal property on the premises, the owner
is entitled to remove the property from the dwelling,
store it for the tenant, and recover actual moving and
storage costs from the tenant. The owner shall make
reasonable efforts to notify the tenant of the location
of the personal property; however, if the property has
been in storage for over 30 days and the tenant has
made no reasonable effort to recover it. the owner
may sell the property and apply the proceeds toward
any amount the tenant owes Any money left over
from the sale of the property shall he handled as specified in Section 78-4-1-1H Nothing contained in this
act shall be in dorogahon o! or alter the owner M
rights under Title 38. C'hapte: 3
IJ«K6

507

JUDICIAL CODE

premises let to an undertenant in case of his unlawful
detention of the premises underlet to him.
1953
78-36-6. Notice to q u i t — How s e r v e d .
The notices required by the preceding sections may
be served:
(1) by delivering a copy to the tenant personally;
(2) by sending a copy through registered or
certified mail addressed to the tenant at his place
of residence;
(3) if he is absent from his place of residence or
from his usual place of business, by leaving a
copy with a person of suitable age and discretion
at either place and mailing a copy to the tenant
at the address of his place of residence or place of
business;
(4) if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be found at the place of residence, then by
affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the
leased property; or
(5) if an order of abatement by eviction of the
nuisance is issued by the court as provided in
Section 78-38-11, when issued, the parties
present shall be on notice that the abatement by
eviction order is issued and immediately effective
or as to any absent party, notice shall be given as
provided in Subsections (1) through (4).
(6) Service upon a subtenant may be made in
the same manner.
1992
78-36-7. N e c e s s a r y parties defendant.
(1) No person other than the tenant of the premises, and subtenant if there is one in the actual occupation of the premises when the action is commenced,
Shall be made a party defendant in the proceeding,
Except as provided in Section 78-38-13, nor shall anyproceeding abate, nor the plaintiff be nonsuited, for
the nonjoinder of any person who might have been
made a party defendant; but when it appears that any
of the parties served with process or appearing in the
proceedings are guilty, judgment shall be rendered
against those parties.
(2) If a person has become subtenant of the premises in controversy after the service of any notice as
provided in this chapter, the fact that such notice was
not served on the subtenant is not a defense to the
action. All persons who enter under the tenant after
the commencement of the action shall be bound by
the judgment the same as if they had been made parties to the action.
(3) A landlord, owner, or designated agent is a necessary party defendant only in an abatement by eviction action for an unlawful drug house as provided in
Section 78-38-13.
"
iinr>
78-36-8.

Allegations p e r m i t t e d in c o m p l a i n t —
Time for a p p e a r a n c e — Service of
summons.
The plaintiff in his complaint, in addition to setting
forth the facts on which he seeks to recover, may set
forth any circumstances of fraud, force, or violence
which may have accompanied the alleged forcible
fentry, or forcible or unlawful detainer, and claim
damages therefor or compensation for the occupation
Of the premises, or both. If the unlawful detainer
Charged is after default in the payment of rent, the
Complaint shall state the amount of rent due. The
Court shall indorse on the summons the number of
days within which the defendant is requhvd to appear and defend the action, which shail not he less
than three or more than 20 days from the date of
Service. The court may authorize service hv publica-

78-36-8.5

tion or mail for cause shown. Service by publication is
complete one week after publication. Service by mail
is complete three days after mailing. The summons
shall be changed in form to conform to the time of
service as ordered, and shall be served as in other
cases.
1987
78-36-8.5.

P o s s e s s i o n b o n d of plaintiff — Alternative r e m e d i e s .
(1) At any time between the filing of his complaint
and the entry of final judgment, the plaintiff may
execute and file a possession bond. The bond may be
in the form of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified
funds, or a property bond executed by two persons
who own real property in the state and who are not
parties to the action. The court shall approve the
bond in an amount that is the probable amount of
costs of suit and damages which may result to the
defendant if the suit has been improperly instituted.
The bond shall be payable to the clerk of the court for
the benefit of the defendant for all costs and damages
actually adjudged against the plaintiff. The plaintiff
shall notify the defendant that he has filed a possession bond. This notice shall be served in the same
manner as service of summons and shall inform the
defendant of all of the alternative remedies and procedures under Subsection (2).
(2) The following are alternative remedies and procedures applicable to an action if the plaintiff files a
possession bond under Subsection (1):
(a) With respect to an unlawful detainer action based solely upon nonpayment of rent or
utilities, the existing contract shall remain in
force and the complaint shall be dismissed if the
defendant, within three days of the service of the
notice of the possession bond, pays accrued rent,
utility charges, any late fee, and other costs, including attorney's fees, as provided in the rental
agreement.
(b) The defendant may remain in possession if
he executes and files a counter bond in the form
of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified funds,
or a property bond executed by two persons who
own real property in the state and who are not
parties to the action. The form of the bond is at
the defendant's option. The bond shall be payable
to the clerk of the court. The defendant shall file
the bond prior to the expiration of three days
from the date he is served with notice of the filing of plaintiffs possession bond. The court shall
approve the bond in an amount that is the probable amount of costs of suit and actual damages
that may result to the plaintiff if the defendant
has improperly withheld possession. The court
shall consider prepaid rent to the owner as a portion of the defendant's total bond.
<c> The defendant, upon demand, shall be
granted a hearing to be held prior to the expiration of three days from the date the defendant is
served with notice of the filing of plaintiffs possession bond.
(3) If the defendant does not elect and comply with
a remedy under Subsection (2) within the required
time, the plaintiff, upon ex parte motion, shall be
granted an order of restitution. The constable of the
precinct or the sheriff of the county where the property is situated shall return possession of the property to the plaintiff promptly.
>•> If the deft-p.dant demand* a hearing under Subsection '2»(c', and if the court rules after the hearing
that the p;ainti<Tis •»:?•.;'led to possession of the property. KK? c.in^Lihie or sheriff shall promptly return
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78-36-7
78-36-8.
78-36-8.5.
78-36-9.
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78-36-12.
78-36-12.3.
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JUDICIAL CODE
Notice to quit — How served.
Necessary- parties defendant
Allegations permitted in complaint —
Time for appearance — Service of
summons
Possession bond of plaintiff — Alternative remedies.
Proof required by plaintiff — Defense.
Judgment for restitution, damages,
and rent — Immediate enforcement
— Treble damages.
Time for appeal.
Exclusion of tenant without judicial
process prohibited — Abandoned
premises excepted.
Definitions.
Abandoned premises — Retaking and
rerenting by owner — Liability of
tenant — Personal property of tenant left on premises.

78-36-1. " F o r c i b l e e n t r y " defined.
Every person is guilty of a forcible entry, who either:
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or other
parts of a house, or by fraud, intimidation or
stealth, or by any kind of violence or circumstances of terror, enters upon or into any real
property; or,
(2) after entering peaceably upon real property, turns out by force, threats or menacing conduct the party in actual possession.
1953
78-36-2. " F o r c i b l e d e t a i n e r " defined.
Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer who
either:
(1) by force, or by menaces and threats of violence, unlawfully holds and keeps the possession
of any real property, whether the same was acquired peaceably or otherwise; or,
(2) in the nighttime, or during the absence of
the occupants of any real property, unlawfully
enters thereon, and, after demand made for the
surrender thereof, refuses for the period of three
days to surrender the same to such former occupant. The occupant of real property within the
meaning of this subdivision is one who within
five days preceding such unlawful entry was in
the peaceable and undisturbed possession of such
lands.
1953
78-36-3.

Unlawful d e t a i n e r by t e n a n t for t e r m
less t h a n life.
( 1 ) A tenant of real property, for a term less than
life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer:
(a) when he continues in possession, in person
or by subtenant, of the property or any part of it,
after the expiration of the specified term or period for which it is let to him, which specified
term or period, whether established by express or
implied contract, or whether written or parol,
shall be terminated without notice at the expiration of the specified term or period;
(b) when, having leased real property for an
indefinite time with monthly or other periodic
rent reserved
(i) he continues in possession of it in person or by subtenant after the end of any
month or period, in cases where the owner,
his designated agent, or any successor in estate of the owner, 15 days or more prior to
the end of that month or period, has served

506

notice requiring him to quit the premises at
the expiration of that month or period; or
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he
remains in possession of the premises after
the expiration of a notice of not less than five
days;
(c) when he continues in possession, in person
or by subtenant, after default in the payment of
any rent and after a notice in writing requiring
in the alternative the payment of the rent or the
surrender of the detained premises, has remained uncomplied with for a period of three
days after service, which notice may be served at
any time after the rent becomes due;
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased
premises contrary to the covenants of the lease,
or commits or permits waste on the premises, or
when he sets up or carries on any unlawful business on or in the premises, or when he suffers,
permits, or maintains on or about the premises
any nuisance, including nuisance as defined in
Section 78-38-9, and remains in possession after
service upon him of a three days' notice to quit;
or
(e) when he continues in possession, in person
or by subtenant, after a neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or
agreement under which the property is held,
other than those previously mentioned, and after
notice in writing requiring in the alternative the
performance of the conditions or covenant or the
surrender of the property, served upon him and
upon any subtenant in actual occupation of the
premises remains uncomplied with for three days
after service. Within three days after the service
of the notice, the tenant, any subtenant in actual
occupation of the premises, any mortgagee of the
term, or other person interested in its continuance may perform the condition or covenant and
thereby save the lease from forfeiture, except
that if the covenants and conditions of the lease
violated by the lessee cannot afterwards be performed, then no notice need be given.
(2) Unlawful detainer by an owner resident of a
mobile home is determined under Title 57, Chapter
16, Mobile Home Park Residency Act.
(3) T h e notice provisions for n u i s a n c e in Subsection 78-36-3(1 )(d) a r e not applicable to n u i s a n c e actions provided in Sections*78-38-9 t h r o u g h 78-38-16
only.
1992
78-36-4.

Right of t e n a n t of a g r i c u l t u r a l l a n d s to
hold over.
In all cases of tenancy upon agricultural lands,
where the tenant has held over and retained possession for more than 60 days after the expiration of his
term without any demand of possession or notice to
quit by the owner, his designated agent, or his successor in estate, he shall be deemed to be held by permission of the owner, his designated agent, or his successor in estate, and shall be entitled to hold under the
terms of the lease for another full year, and shall not
be guilty of an unlawful detainer during that year;
and the holding over for the 60-day period shall be
taken and construed as a consent on the part of the
tenant to hold for another year.
1981
78-36-5.

R e m e d i e s a v a i l a b l e to t e n a n t a g a i n s t
undertenant.
A tenant may take proceedings similar to (hose
prescribed in this chapter to obtain possession of the
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78-35-4.
78-35-5.
78-35-6.
78-35-7.
78-35-8.
78-35-9.
78-35-10.

JUDICIAL CODE
Recommitment.
Recommitment after discharge forbidden — Exceptions.
Refusing to exhibit authority for detention — Penalty.
Penalties for wrongful acts of defendant.
Judgment of ouster — Costs — Penalty
by fine where state is party.
Judgment against director of corporation — Of induction in favor of person
entitled.
Action for damages because of usurpation — Limitation of action.
Mandamus and prohibition — Judgment.
Disobedience of writ — Punishment.

78-35-1.

Penalty for wrongful refusal to allow
writ of h a b e a s c o r p u s .
Any judge, whether acting individually or as a
member of a court, who wrongfully and willfully refuses to allow a writ of habeas corpus whenever
proper application for the same has been made shall
forfeit and pay a sum not exceeding $5,000 to the
party thereby aggrieved.
1953

78-35-2. R e c o m m i t m e n t
In all cases where it is claimed that a person is
illegally or wrongfully restrained or deprived of his
liberty, where such restraint or imprisonment is for a
criminal offense and there is not sufficient cause for
discharge (even though the commitment may have
been informally made or without due authority, or
the process may have been executed by a person not
duly authorized) the court or judge may make a new
commitment, or admit the party to bail, if the case is
bailable. And all material witnesses shall also be required to enter into a recognizance to appear at the
same time and place and not depart therefrom without leave. All such papers must be filed in the clerk's
office where the same are made returnable.
1953
78-35-3.

Recommitment after discharge forbidden — Exceptions.
No person who has been discharged by order of the
court or judge upon habeas corpus shall be again imprisoned, restrained, or kept in custody for the same
cause, except in the following cases:
(1) if he has been discharged from custody on a
criminal charge and is afterward committed for
the same offense by legal order or process.
(2) if, after discharge for defect lofi proof or for
any defect of the process, warrant or commitment
in a criminal case, the prisoner is again arrested
on sufficient proof and committed by legal process for the same offense.
1953
78-35-4.

Refusing to exhibit authority for detention — Penalty.
A person refusing to deliver a copy of the legal process by which he detains the plaintiff in custody to
anyone who demands such copy for the purpose of
taking out a writ of habeas corpus shall forfeit not
exceeding $200 to the plaintiff.
1953
78-35-5.

P e n a l t i e s for w r o n g f u l a c t s of defendant.
If the defendant attempts to evade the service of
the writ of habeas corpus, or if the defendant or any
officer willfully fails to comply with the legal duties
imposed upon him, or if he disobeys the order of discharge, he is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, and

78-35-10

shall also forfeit to the person aggrieved not more
than $5,000. Any person knowingly aiding in or abetting invalidation of this section is subject to the same
punishment and forfeiture.
i9*i
78-35-6.

J u d g m e n t of o u s t e r — C o s t s — P e n a l t y
by fine w h e r e s t a t e is p a r t y .
When a defendant is found guilty of usurping, intruding into or unlawfully holding or exercising an
office, franchise or privilege, judgment shall be rendered that such defendant be ousted and altogether
excluded therefrom, and that the relator recover his
costs. The court may also, in its discretion, in actions
to which the state is a party impose upon the defendant a fine not exceeding $5,000, which fine when
collected must be paid into the state treasury.
1953
78-35-7.

J u d g m e n t against director of corporation — Of induction in favor of person
entitled.
When the action is against a director of a corporation, and the court finds that, at his election, either
illegal votes were received or legal votes were rejected, or both, sufficient to change the result, judgment may be rendered that the defendant be ousted,
and judgment of induction entered in favor of the person who was entitled to be declared elected at such
election.
1953
78-35-8.

Action for d a m a g e s b e c a u s e of usurpation — Limitation of action.
Such person may, at any time within one year after
the date of such judgment, bring an action against
the party ousted and recover the damages he sustained by reason of such usurpation.
1953
78-35-9.

Mandamus and prohibition — J u d g ment.
In any proceeding to obtain a writ of mandate or
prohibition, if judgment is given for the applicant, he
may recover the damages which he has sustained, as
found by the jury, or as may be determined by the
court, or referees upon a reference ordered, together
with costs; and for such damages and costs an execution may issue, and a peremptory mandate must also
be awarded without delay.
1953
78-35-10. D i s o b e d i e n c e of writ — Punishment.
When a peremptory writ of mandate or writ of prohibition has been issued and directed to an inferior
tribunal, corporation, board or person, if it appears to
the court that any member of such tribunal, corporation, board or person upon whom such writ has been
personally served has, without just excuse, refused or
neglected to obey the same, the court may, upon motion, impose a fine not exceeding $500. In cases of
persistence in a refusal of obedience, the court may
order the party to be imprisoned until the writ is
obeyed, and may make any orders necessary and
proper for the complete enforcement of the writ. 1953
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
. PY
M-^

IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH"
OOOoo
BRIAN HEAD SKI, LTD., a Utah
limited partnership,

ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff.
Civil NO. 913000-^298

v.

Judge Braithwaite

BRIAN HEAD LEASING, LTD.,
RUSTY'S RESTAURANTS, INC., a
corporation dba SUNBURST or
SUNBURST RESTAURANT, and
RUSSELL AIKEN aka "RUSTY"
AIKEN,
Defendants.
ooOoo

THIS MATTER came for hearing before the Court on May
18, 1993, at which time the Court heard oral arguments on the
Motion For Summary Judgment filed by plaintiff Brian Head Ski,
Ltd.

The plaintiff Brian Head Ski, Ltd. was represented by Larry

G. Moore, the defendant Brian Head Leasing, Ltd. was represented
by Michael W. Park, and the defendant Rusty's Restaurant, Inc.
was represented by Patrick H. Fenton.

The defendant Rusty's

Restaurant, Inc. did not take a position on the Motion.

At the

request of its counsel, Mr. Park, the Court granted defendant
Brian Head Leasing, Ltd. additional time to file a Supplemental
Memorandum, to which the plaintiff Brian Head Ski, Ltd. has filed
a Reply to Supplemental Memorandum.

The Court having fully considered all of the pleadings
on file, and the arguments of counsel, does hereby order, judge
and decree as follow:
1.

No genuine issue exists as to any material fact

necessary to a resolution of plaintiff's motion, and plaintiff
Brian Head Ski, Ltd. is entitled to, and is hereby granted,
judgment as a matter of law.
2.

The Ground Lease at issue was duly terminated

prior to any alleged offset by payment of taxes or cure by
defendant Brian Head Leasing, Ltd., and defendant Brian Head
Leasing, Ltd,f or any parties claiming through itf have no
interest in the Property which was formerly subject to the Ground
Lease.
3.

Ownership of the Building and other improvements

to the Property reverted to the plaintiff Brian Head Ski, Ltd. as
owner of fee title to the Property upon the termination of the
Ground Lease.

This ruling does not affect ownership of any

personal property, equipment or trade fixtures in the Building on
the Property.
4.

Plaintiff Brian Head Ski, Ltd. is entitled to all

rents paid into Court by the former occupant of the Building, on
the basis that all such rents accrued and were paid subsequent to
the termination of the Ground Lease.
5.

This Order shall become effective on the date it

is signed by the Court.
-2-

DATED this //)

day of < = ^ ^ 4 % ^ M

1993.

BY THE COURT:

zrz%?2&

District Judge

34691.Ol/lgm
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/

JAMES S. JARDINE (A1647) and
LARRY G. MOORE (A2305) of
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
79 South Main Street
P. 0. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
BRIAN HEAD SKI, LTD., a Utah
limited partnership,

:
MEMORANDUM OF BRIAN
HEAD SKI, LTD. IN SUPPORT
OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

Civil

BRIAN HEAD LEASING, LTD.,
RUSTY'S RESTAURANTS, INC., a
corporation dba SUNBURST or
SUNBURST RESTAURANT, and
RUSSELL AIKEN aka "RUSTY" AIKEN,

. 913000-298

Judge Braithwaite

Defendants.
ooOoo
COMES NOW the plaintiff, Brian Head Ski, Ltd.
(hereinafter "Plaintiff"'!

MUM

• 111nu i i <., i

MM

I
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the Court in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant
to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure against the
defendants Brian Head Leasin

I

(Iw

Rusty's Restaurants, Inc. dba Sunburst

-'•••^ftnr

"I'll l,oasinij") ,

Sunburst Restaurant,

and Russell Aiken aka Rusty Aiken, on the basis that there is no
genuine issue a

material fact necessary to this motion,

and Plaintiff is entitled to the relief requested and judgment
against defendants as a matter of law.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff seeks summary judgment confirming that the
Ground Lease has been terminated and that BH Leasing has no
rights in the Property, or the improvements thereon.

The

defendant BH Leasing admits through the deposition of its general
partner Harold Jensen, Jr. ("Jensen") that it failed to make the
annual rent payments due under the Ground Lease for twelve
consecutive years and that it may never have made any payments
under the Ground Lease.

Defendant BH Leasing also admits that it

received a written notice of its default under the Ground Lease,
and that it made no effort to cure the default within the time
period required.

Nearly three months after the termination of

the Ground Lease and the filing of this lawsuit, Jensen sent a
personal check purporting to cure BH Leasing's default, which
check was refused.

BH Leasing's sole defense to its obligation

to pay rent, was a claim of "offsets" due to alleged obligations
of BH Enterprises in the form of unpaid loans allegedly made by
Harold Jensen to Burton Nichols, or unpaid rents and taxes
allegedly due from the original BH Enterprises.

These alleged

offsets are invalid under both Federal Bankruptcy law, and under
Utah law, for the reasons set forth below.

-2-

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
, tember i, 2 9 3 8, Br Ian Head
Enterprises, Inc. (I!BH Enterprises") , entered into a Ground Lease
Agreement (the "Ground Lease") with defendant BH Leasing*
nil I IIIP fiT'ouml II a; i"" I1 i")! eement Jb iiLLaclieiJ a,1,. Exhibit

,f

A c i
+"o the

Affidavit of James Trees ("Trees Affidavit") , The Ground Lease
related to that certain real property described in Exhibit:
operty 1 )

the Trees Affida*

(Jensen Dep. pp. 15-16)

the Property is constructed a seasonal snack
bar and fast food restaurant for the Brian Head Ski Resort.
( A f f 1 <iii, v [ I

«ml

.It fill

""I"! e t i s

pp ,

'I |

The Ground Lease provided, among other
obligations, that BH Leasing pay to the ground ] p ^ r m ,I ••
Hundred Dollars.

'Tensen Dep. Ex. "1")

BH Leasing failed to p«-. ;he annual rent due ^..o
the ground lessor as required
consecu tive years.

(Jensen Dep. pp. 28-29)
or about Novembei

198 6 an involuntary

Chapter / oankruptcy petition i was ; '
various creditors.

fiqanpii HI1 Kntei ,,, ,^: ,

In December of 1987, BH Enterprises agreed

convert the case to a Chapter

: bankruptcy denominated as In r e :
\ iI

Brian Head Enterprises, Inc
the United States Bankruptcy Court

-

District of Utah.

(Disclosure Statement On Joint Consolidated Plan of
Reorganization

^ Unsecu: <.-.;.,
-3-

. _t ,r- s

n

Committee", hereinafter ("Disclosure Statement") p. 3). A copy
of the disclosure Statement is attached to the Trees Aff. as
Exhibit "E".
6.

On August 15, 1990, after notice and a hearing,

the Bankruptcy Court signed an "Order Confirming Joint
Consolidated Plan of Reorganization of Trustee and Official
Unsecured Creditor's Committee" (the "Order"), which approved the
Plan of Reorganization dated as of May 22, 1990 (the "Plan").
True and correct copies of the Order and the Plan are attached as
Exhibits "C" and "D", respectively, to the Trees Affidavit,
7.

BH Leasing purports to be a limited partnership,

however there is no evidence of the filing of a certificate of
limited partnership in Utah or California, and BH Leasing has not
filed any tax returns,

(Jensen Dep. pp. 6-8)

Harold Jensen, Jr.

("Jensen") is the sole general partner of BH Leasing and acts as
the managing general partner.

(Jensen Dep. p. 8)

Jensen was

also a stockholder and director of the co-debtor in bankruptcy,
Brian Head Corporation.

Jensen testified he doesn,t know if he

was a stockholder of BH Enterprises, although he did receive
shares in BH Enterprises from Burton Nichols. (Jensen Dep. pp.
11-12)
8.

On or about July 26, 1991, notice was given by

certified mail return receipt requested to BH Leasing (through
its general partner Jensen) by and on behalf of the Trustee in
Bankruptcy for BH Enterprises, that BH Leasing was in default of
-4-
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its obligations under the Ground Lease, and that BH Leasing's
rights under the Ground Lease would be terminated without further
ed and payment made within three
days after service of said notice upon BH Leasing. (Jensen Dep.
pp. 31-33, Ex.

»
L'.'fii in I intwledged receipt of the certified

mailing of the notice on Jul y 30,.1991. (Jensen Dep. Ex.

)

The said notice was also posted upon the Property
(Complc
I II

BH Leasing made no attempt to cure the default

within the time period specified i n the notice and Jensen > = "answei

ui: explana
12

..

- H I H n^+-

(Jensen Dep

i .

o
3?)

Since BH Leasing failed to cure the default within

the time period specified in the notii:^
August

this action was

confirm that BH Leasing's rights under the

Ground Lease were terminated, and that BH Leasing and any
subtenants of BH Leasing were :i i I i 11 I 1 a\ rfI i] de 1: ai ner of 1:1 :t
Property.
about October
termination ui une Ground Lease,
ormer trustee in bankruptcy.

1991 and subsequent to the
m.ul I hi'i ppr&o, .
That check arrived months

subsequent to the termination * : the Ground Lease, and waf
refused, and the check was not,
(Jensen Dep. p

;

w Trees Aff. •.-. 14)

-5-
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14.

Jensen has claimed a right of "offset" in that in

the "early 1980's" he alleged that he personally loaned
approximately $25,000 to Burton Nichols or BH Enterprises, but
that he does not remember the exact amount.

The alleged loan was

not evidenced by any note or writing, and was not secured by any
lien or collateral.
15.

(Jensen Dep. pp. 13-14)

Jensen has also claimed an "offset" due to two

certain undocumented loans or advances of uncertain amount (total
less than $10,000) in approximately 1983 or 1984, one of which
was allegedly to provide earnest money for an unrelated property
purchase and one of which was "to purchase partnership shares or
something like that".
16.

(Jensen Dep. pp. 38-39)

Concurrently with the execution of the Ground

Lease in 1978# the original BH Enterprises (as contrasted with
the "Reorganized Debtor" under the Plan) entered into a building
lease for a term of five years with BH Leasing, and then
subleased the building to a third party.

(Jensen Dep. pp. 35-37)

Jensen and/or BH Leasing claim a right of offset based on rents
and property taxes which should have been paid by BH Enterprises
under the alleged building lease or other agreements.

(Jensen

Dep. p. 35)
17.

Jensen and BH Leasing were aware of the BH

Enterprises bankruptcy, and received numerous notices from the
Bankruptcy Court. (Jensen Dep. pp. 14-15)

-6-

Jensen was represented

and appeared through Jeqal counsel A\ I lit1 P^ni inntry Court
hearing on confirmation of the Plan. (Order i
18,

1)

With respect to the alleged offsets set forth in

Statements of Fact, J.<* ihrough
claim with the Bankruptcy Court with respect

the amounts

e

claimed BH Enterprises or Burton Nichols owed him, (Jensen Dep.
pp.

40)
1°

Although BH Leasing was aware of the BH

Enterprises bankruptcy through its sole general partner Jensen,
:i !:: ::i :li ::i i :i ::: I:: f j ] = a i ty j : :i : • :: :: f • :: >f :: It a :i in c 1 a:i iici :i i v j an i of fse t

(c

anything else), nor was BH Leasing listed oii the Schedule of
Creditors as being owed money by BH Enterprises, or as having a
\ • I r i n?i < 11 j ,i) n *. f

2U,

Pi 11 I' 111 i i 111 • i r i s •

( 0 1 d e i >. \ \ i 1 1" I

)

Pursuant to the Plan and Order, the original

debtor BH Enterprises was "reorganized"
Brian Head iTiterpi 1st1",, I'm

i I In1

reconstituted as

keorgan . _ e i Debtoi ") , whose

stock was owned by the secured creditors of the former BH
Enterprises.

(Disclosure Statement Article IX,

; Plan p.

Paragraph 3 2 of the Order provides that
Upon entry of the Confirmation Order.
the terms of the Plan will be binding upon
the Debtor, the reorganized Debtor, and any
and all creditors and equity security holders
of the Debtor, whether or not the claims or
interests of such creditors or equity
security holders are impaired under the plan
" ' whether or not such creditors or equity
-7-

security holders have accepted the Plan,
(emphasis added.)
The Order was entered August 17, 1990.
22.

(Order p.14)

Pursuant to paragraph M of the Order, the alleged

"offsets" claimed by BH Leasing (and/or Jensen) were
"discharged".

Such paragraph provides as follows:

Effective on the confirmation date of
the Plan, the Debtor (BH Enterprises) is
discharged from any claim and debt (as that
term is defined in Section 101(11) of the
Bankruptcy Code), and, as a result of entry
of this Order, Section 1141(d) of the
Bankruptcy Code, and the Debtor's liability
in respect thereof is extinguished
completely, whether reduced to judgment or
not, liguidated or unliquidated, contingent
or noncontingent, asserted or unasserted,
fixed or not, matured or unmatured, disputed
or undisputed, legal or equitable, known or
unknown, that arose from any agreement of the
Debtor entered into or obligation of the
Debtor incurred before the Confirmation Date,
or from any conduct of the Debtor prior to
the Confirmation Date, or that otherwise
arose before the Confirmation Date,
including, without limitation, all interest,
if any, on any such debts, whether such
interest accrued before or after the date of
commencement of the Case, and from any
liability of a kind specified in section 502
of the Bankruptcy Code, whether or not a
proof of claim is filed or deemed filed under
section 501 of the Bankruptcy Code, whether
such claim is allowed under section 502 of
the Bankruptcy Code, or the holder of such
claim has accepted the Plan. (emphasis
added.)
23.

Pursuant to paragraph N of the Order, BH Leasing,

Jensen and all other creditors of BH Enterprises, were

-8-

permanently enjoined from asserting rights of offset against BH
Enterprises

•

-

I i.ir a y r a p h

1» < »w »«.k>«.

N. . . .all Persons who have held or may
hold Claims (as defined in the Plan) against
. . . the Debtor . . . or interests in
property of the Debtor or of the Debtor's
estate are permanently enjoined on and after
the Confirmation Date (1) from commencing or
continuing in any manner any action or other
proceeding of any kind with respect to such
Claim or interest against the Debtor, the
Reorganized Debtor (as defined in the Plan),
the property of the Debtor, or the property
of the Reorganized Debtor; . . . (4) from
asserting any setoff, right of subrogation,
or recoupment of any kind against any
obligation due the Debtor or the Reorganized
Debtor; and (5) from any act, in any manner,
in any place whatsoever, that does not
conform to or comply with the provisions of
the Plan. (emphasis added,)
Pursuant t

paragraph 68 of the Plan, after uae
Reorganized Debtor had the

power to sell all of the property free and clear of all liens and
interests, with liens and interest's to attach to tne
such

.

"Consummation Date" o. the Plan

was May 31. ;: *:-.
25.
Briaii *
all of
Resort.

^ceeds of

;

(Plan ;
* .'

"

ondomii

, the pi a i n tiff as as^tqi PDevelopment Corporation, acquired

assets (but not the liabilities) of the Brian Head Ski
Included in those assets was the fee t:J t] e I

Proper!
Ground Lease,

I:

essor's interest in the previously terminated
(Trees Aff

p

•}
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26.

The Property and the lessor's interest in the

Ground Lease were purchased from the Reorganized Debtor pursuant
to the Plan.

Pursuant to paragraph 68 of the Plan, the sale of

the Property and the lessor's interest in the terminated Ground
Lease was "Free and clear of liens and interests, with liens and
interests, as affixed by the Plan or the Court, to attach to the
net proceeds of any such sale".
27.

Plaintiff paid in excess of $6,000,000 for such

assets, which included the fee title to the Property and the
lessor's interest in the terminated Ground Lease.

As a part of

such consideration, Plaintiff also paid approximately $55,763.78
to West One Bank, to obtain a release of a trust deed on the
building on the Ground Lease Parcel.
28.

(Trees Aff. p. 7)

On June 29, 1992 Plaintiff filed a Notice of Real

Party in Interest and Appearance of Counsel in this suit.
29.

The sole means of ingress and egress to the

Property granted to BH Leasing and any successors, assigns
customers or invitees in connection with the Ground Lease was a
twenty-five foot wide easement from the parking lot of the Brian
Head Ski Resort, directly to the Property.
Ex.

(Trees Aff. p. 16,

,f M

B ) (Jensen Dep. pp. 48, 49)
30.

The easement, accesses, entrances and exits to the

building have been used only since 1978. There is no written
easement or other written document dealing with access, except
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the easement referred to in the Ground Lease.

(Jensen Dep. pp.

48, 49)
31.

The access utilized during the ski season by BH

Leasing and its purported sublessee to the Property, are not
within the easement provided in the Ground Lease and constitute a
trespass.

(Trees Aff. p. 17)
32.

Any alleged possessory rights of Rusty's

Restaurants, Inc. or the other named defendants as alleged
••sublessee" of BH Leasing, expired prior to the date hereof at
the conclusion of the 1992-1993 ski season.

(Jensen Dep. pp.

24-25)
33.

Rusty's Restaurants, Inc. and/or the other named

defendants purporting to be "sublessees" of BH Leasing have paid
all rents due for the 1992-1993 ski season into Court pending the
Court's resolution of this suit.
34.

The Plan provided for payment of all real property

taxes owed to the Iron County Treasurer with respect to the
Property and its related improvements from the proceeds of the
sale of assets by the Reorganized Debtor.

(Plan p. 69(4))

At

the time BH Leasing purported to pay taxes on the Building on the
Property, the Ground Lease had already been terminated and funds
were in escrow from Plaintiff's purchase of the Property to pay
all real property taxes on the Property or the Building.
Plaintiff paid the 1992 real property taxes on-ftie Property and
the Building.

(Trees Aff p. 7)
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ARGUMENT
I.

BH Leasing's Claim of Offset Is Invalid and

Unenforceable because it has been Discharged and because
Plaintiff Purchased the Property Free and Clear of Liens,
Interests and Claims Under Federal Bankruptcy Lav.
The undisputed facts establish that the Ground
Lease has been terminated due to BH Leasing's admitted failure to
timely pay ground rents due after receiving notice and
opportunity to cure, and that ownership of the Property and
improvements and Building thereon have reverted to Plaintiff,
unless notwithstanding the Bankruptcy Plan and Order, BH Leasing
had a valid right of "offset" which fully excused it from payment
of ground rents. As is obvious from the Statement of Undisputed
Facts set forth above, no such defense exists because claims of
offset are discharged, barred, released and enjoined under the
Plan and Order, and additionally because Plaintiff Purchased the
Property free and clear of liens, claims and interests.
A.

BH Leasing's alleged "offsets" are discharged,

barred, released and enjoined under the Bankruptcy Plan and
Order.
Despite having actual notice of the Bankruptcy
through its sole general partner, BH Leasing filed no proof of
claim in the Bankruptcy asserting that it had a right of offset
against BH Enterprises, nor was it listed in the Bankruptcy
Schedules as having any claim against BH Enterprises.
-12-

Any

alleged offset is now barred by failure to file a proof of claim
and pursuant to the Plan.

More importantly, under paragraph M of

the Order, any alleged "offsets" claimed by BH Leasing are
"discharged" and "extinguished completely", "whether or not a
proof of claim is filed • . . or allowed, and whether or not "the
holder of such claim has accepted the Plan".

(Order pp. 12-13)

Under paragraph N of the Order, BH Leasing was "permanently
enjoined" from asserting any interest in the real property of the
Debtor (BH Enterprises) or the Reorganized Debtor, and was
"permanently enjoined" from asserting any "setoff or right of
recoupment of any kind against the Debtor (BH Enterprises) or the
Reorganized Debtor."

The position taken by BH Leasing in this

suit is expressly precluded by the provisions of the Plan, the
Order, and the Bankruptcy Code, and for that reason alone, the
Plaintiff is entitled to entry of summary judgment against BH
Leasing and anyone claiming rights under it.
B.

BH Leasing's alleged offsets and its alleged

interest under the Ground Lease are not enforceable against the
Property or Plaintiff because Plaintiff purchased the Property
free and clear of liens, claims and interests.
Under the Plan, the assets of BH Enterprises,
including the Property and the lessor's interest under the
terminated Ground Lease, vested in the Reorganized Debtor "free
and clear of liens, claims and interests (Disclosure Statement;
Plan p. 64) as permitted pursuant to Section 1123(a)(5)(D) and
-13-

Section 363(b)(1) and (f) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Paragraph 68

of the Plan provided that the Reorganized Debtor had the power
after the Consummation Date of the Plan (May 31, 1991) to sell
all of the property and rights of the Reorganized Debtor "free
and clear of liens and interests", with liens and interest to
attach to the proceeds of such sale.

(Plan p. 30)

•The Purchase Agreement under which Plaintiff acquired
the Property and the groundlessor's interest in the terminated
Ground Lease, expressly provided in paragraphs 6(c) and 7(a),
that the conveyance of the Property was free and clear of liens
and encumbrances pursuant to the Plan.

(Trees Aff. p. 3). In

addition, paragraph 4(f) of the Purchase Agreement provided that:
"Unless specifically agreed in writing, Buyer
is not assuming or taking subject to any
liabilities of any nature arising from or
associated with the Property or arising from
or accruing due to activities, events, facts
or circumstances prior to the actual Closing
Date."
The Closing Date was May 21, 1992.

(Trees Aff. p. 3)

The Ground

Lease had been terminated prior to Plaintiffs purchase of the
Property.

In addition, by virtue of the Plan, Plaintiff

purchased the Property free and clear of BH Leasing's claim that
it had an interest in such Property or the Building and
improvements thereon by virtue of the Ground Lease, and for both
of these additional independent reasons, Plaintiff is entitled to
entry of summary judgment.
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II.

BH Leasings alleged payment of taxes on the

Building do not give rise to a defense to termination of the
Ground Lease.
BH Leasing has alleged an offset or defense to
termination of the Ground Lease in that it asserts that it paid
property taxes on the Building which should have been paid by BH
Enterprises.

This payment of property taxes was made by Jensen

by personal check on February 3, 1992 some seven months after the
Ground Lease had already been terminated in August of 1991.
Furthermore, as set forth above, under the Bankruptcy Plan and
Order this claim of offset was both "discharged and enjoined" as
it allegedly related to an obligation to pay taxes for the years
1987-1991, and because as set forth above Plaintiff purchased the
Property (including the Building and improvements which reverted
to the Reorganized Debtor upon termination of the Ground Lease)
"without assuming or taking subject to any liabilities of any
nature arising from or associated with the Property or arising
from or accruing due to activities, events, facts or
circumstances prior to the actual Closing Date."
Closing Date was May 21, 1992.

The actual

(Trees Aff. p. 3)

In addition to the foregoing which clearly show that no
valid "offset" to termination of the Ground Lease exists, the
payment of taxes by Jensen would not, in any event, create an
"offset" to ground lease rents due from BH Leasing to BH
Enterprises, because there is an absence of the "mutuality of
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obligation" which is a legal pre-requisite to any assertion of
right of offset.

In order to have a valid setoff, reciprocal

claims must exist between the same parties in the same capacity
at the same time,

2 0 Am Jur 2d § 7 4 ; First Security Bank of

Utah, N.A. v. Utah Turkey Growers, Inc., 610 P.2d 329 (Utah
1980).

Jensen is not the same party as BH Leasing, even if he is

its general partner.

His issuance of his personal check for an

alleged obligation that had already been terminated, creates no
claim or right whatsoever in BH Leasing.

Jensen acted as a

"volunteer" in paying property taxes on the Building, at a time
when funds were in escrow to pay such taxes (Trees Aff. p. 7 ) .
Plaintiff paid the 1992 property taxes on the Building and the
Property.

For all of the reasons set forth above, the alleged

payment of taxes by Jensen (or even by BH Leasing) is legally
insufficient to prevent summary judgment.
III.

BH Leasing has not acquired any "prescriptive

easement", not has it established a "boundary by acquiescence".
Although the issues of prescriptive easement or
boundary by acquiescence are legally "moot" since the Ground
Lease had been terminated, since BH Leasing has raised those
issues Plaintiff feels compelled to point out that such claims
are wholly without merit.
Jensen testified in his deposition that BH Leasing and
its tenants and subtenants had used the entrances and exists to
the Building only since 1978.

(Jensen Dep. pp. 48-49)
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Under

Utah law, no claim can be made for a prescriptive easement unless
the use has been continuous for a period in excess of twenty
years.

See Utah Code Annotated Sections 78-12-10 and

78-12-11(1), and Anderson v. Osouthorpe, 504 P.2d 1000 (Utah
1972).

And while the doctrine of a "boundary by acquiescence"

has no relevance whatsoever to a question of whether use of
•particular ingress and egress locations is legal, Plaintiff would
also point out that establishment of a property right under that
doctrine also requires twenty years of continuous acquiescence•
See Halladav v. Cluff. 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984) and Staker v.
Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is clear based on
the Undisputed Facts set forth above, and the terms of the
Bankruptcy Court Order and Plan, that Plaintiff is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law confirming:

that the Ground Lease

has been previously terminated; that ownership of the Building
and improvements thereon has thereby reverted to the Plaintiff as
owner of the Property; and that the Plaintiff is entitled to
receive all rents which have been paid into Court by the occupant
of the Property.

Plaintiff reserves the right to at a later date

to seek an award of attorneys' fees against BH Leasing and/or
Jensen in this Court or the Bankruptcy Court, and to seek civil
contempt or other sanctions against BH Leasing or its partners in
Bankruptcy Court.
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Dated this

day of April, 1993.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Lan^L-C* Moore
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Brian Head Ski, Ltd,
25418,01/lgra
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